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We present a model of deliberative inclusion, focusing on reciprocity in the interaction
between structural minorities/disadvantaged groups and majorities/privileged groups.
Our model, however, comes with a ‘friendly amendment’: we have put the ‘burden of
reciprocity’ mainly on majorities and privileged groups. It is mainly their obligation
to seriously listen and respond to the demands and arguments of minorities and
disadvantaged groups and show a willingness to respect and accommodate these interests.
Empirically, we apply our model to the interaction of linguistic groups in the Swiss
parliament. We find a highly egalitarian, sometimes even minority-favoring mode
of interaction between the German-speaking majority and linguistic minorities.
The German-speaking majority seems to be willing to take the ‘burden of reciprocity’
when linguistic minorities’ vital interests are concerned. Conversely, linguistic
minorities are slightly more self-referential and adversarial under such conditions.
Keywords: deliberation; minorities; inclusion
Introduction
The inclusion of structural minorities and disadvantaged groups looms large in the
study of democracy. The standard majoritarian model of democracy is widely
understood to be frequently unable to safeguard vital interests of structural minorities
and disadvantaged groups. Therefore, several institutional devices have been pro-
posed in order to include and advance the interests of minorities and disadvantaged
groups. In the past decade, however, the study of inclusion has increasingly taken
a deliberative turn (Williams, 1998; Urbinati, 2000; Valadez, 2001; Dryzek
and Niemeyer, 2008). Rather than focusing on formal and institutional means of
inclusion (such as proportional representation, a minority veto, or re-districting),
many deliberative approaches take an informal and dynamic view of inclusion
* E-mail: pedrini@ipz.uzh.ch
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(see O’Flynn, 2010). Both mainstream and Habermasian-inspired versions of delib-
eration entail the idea of equal participation and symmetric dialogue, reasoned
argument, common-good orientation, serious and respectful listening (and respond-
ing) to other participants’ claims, and mutual agreement based on the ‘forceless force
of the better argument’. These ideas spark hope for promoting the interests of
structural minorities and disadvantaged groups.
Despite interest in deliberative approaches in recent years, the exact specifica-
tion and empirical translation of deliberative ideals in the context of minority
inclusion has lagged. This lag may not be so surprising, given that deliberative
approaches are far from fool-proof devices for inclusion. The problem is that
mainstream and Habermasian-inspired forms of deliberation might actually
hamper inclusionary goals. For instance, why should disadvantaged groups
respectfully listen to privileged groups or even transcend their interests in the light
of the ‘better’ argument, especially if they have experienced inequality or if their
vital interests are at stake? As Williams (1998) has noted, requiring the selflessness
and self-transformation of the disadvantaged is deeply unfair. This is a valid
objection that is not easily addressed by the mainstream deliberative approach.
Therefore, we propose a deliberative approach with ‘friendly amendments’. Our
approach focuses on one crucial principle of deliberation – reciprocity – but with
a twist. Reciprocity means that discourse participants should listen and respond to
each other and do so respectfully. However, the trick is to place the ‘burden of
reciprocity’ primarily on majorities and privileged groups; it is mainly their
obligation to seriously listen and respond to the demands and arguments of the
disadvantaged and show a willingness to respect and accommodate these inter-
ests. Conversely, structural minorities and disadvantaged groups are not held fully
accountable to these standards. They may be deliberative, but may also adopt a
more adversarial stance toward majorities and privileged groups. This relaxation,
however, is conditional and partial. On the one hand, the less inequality structural
minorities and disadvantaged groups have experienced and the less their vital
interests are at stake, the more we expect them to converge to majority standards.
On the other hand, minorities are also expected to make ‘just’ demands that do
not compromize the basic well-being of majorities.
As with defining proper standards of deliberative inclusion, there has also been
little empirical and systematic examination of inclusion in the context of struc-
tural minorities and disadvantaged groups. In this study, we make a first step in
this direction and investigate patterns of reciprocity in the context of linguistic
minorities in Switzerland (French, Italian and Romansh speakers).1 To be sure,
linguistic groups in Switzerland do not directly qualify as ‘disadvantaged’ groups
(such as African Americans in the United States), since they have not experienced
1 In 2000, the Swiss population (foreigners not included) consisted of 72.5% Swiss-German citizens,
21% French-speaking citizens, 4.3% Italian speaking and 0.6% Romansh-speaking citizens (Eidgen-
o¨ssische Volksza¨hlung, 2000).
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deep inequality or oppression. However, they form structural minorities, and
when their vital interests are at stake, they have no formal veto power to prevent
unwanted legislation but are largely dependent on the decisions of the German-
speaking majority to realize their interests. Moreover, there have been recurrent
complaints of marginalization of linguistic minorities by German speakers. As
such, an empirical investigation of deliberative inclusion of linguistic minorities in
Switzerland is far from misdirected. At the same time, the institutional archi-
tecture of the Swiss political system is also conducive to deliberative forms of
policy-making: it is a consensus system with non-parliamentary features, enabling
political actors to engage in deliberation. Moreover, the party system is not
organized along linguistic cleavages, reducing partisan incentives to politicize
linguistic conflicts. This is combined with a specific motivation among the German-
speaking majority to be receptive to demands from linguistic minorities (Ba¨chtiger
and Steiner, 2004). Thus, favorable institutional conditions and appropriate actor
motivations should provide fertile ground for our conception of deliberative inclu-
sion. Put differently, the Swiss case enables us to explore how well the ideal of
reciprocity is realized in practice when conditions are fairly ideal. Of course, future
research will need to engage in comparative analysis, but the goal of this article is to
delineate a starting point for empirical analysis and to test a novel set of methodo-
logical tools to capture patterns of reciprocity in real world decision cases.
We focus on two Swiss parliamentary decisions that deal with linguistic issues
and directly concern linguistic minorities’ vital interests, namely the language
article and the language bill; in addition, we focus on a contrasting decision, the
labor law revision, which does not touch upon vital interests of the linguistic
minorities. For the three cases, we explore patterns of reciprocity in the committee
and plenary debates of the first and second chambers of parliament. We analyze
how often linguistic minorities are referred to, how often linguistic minorities
refer to other actors, and whether this is done in a respectful or disrespectful way.
Further, we perform an in-depth analysis of reciprocity and explore how often the
arguments of linguistic minorities are referred to by the German-speaking
majority and whether this is done in a respectful (or disrespectful) way. Our
empirical analysis of deliberative inclusion draws on Steven Levitt’s (2004) analysis of
discrimination in the United States. We calculate frequencies for reciprocity rates as a
function of the speaker’s status – linguistic minority or linguistic majority – con-
trolling for other characteristics of the speaker (such as gender, role, or partisan
affiliation), as well as characteristics of the context (different issues or first vs. second
chamber). While a major focus of our article is to determine the extent of deliberative
inclusion of linguistic minorities in parliamentary debates, we also attempt to shed
some light on potential intervening contextual factors, namely public vs. non-public
arenas, and issues touching upon vital interests of linguistic minorities vs. other issues.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section presents
our model of deliberative inclusion. The third section provides background on
deliberative inclusion in the context of linguistic groups in Switzerland, identifies
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some contexts of deliberative inclusion, discusses the methodological approach,
and presents the empirical results. The fourth section concludes.
Models of minority inclusion: from the ‘politics of presence’ to deliberative
politics (with ‘friendly amendments’)
How can the interests of structural minorities and disadvantaged groups be
equally included in processes of political decision making? This is a crucial
question for democratic theory, since structural minorities and disadvantaged
groups cannot hope to become majorities or advantaged groups in the near or
even distant future (such as electorally produced minorities who can hope to be
turned into majorities in the next legislative period). Rather, their cultural and
economic flourishing is dependent on the actions of majorities and privileged
groups. Classic roads to minority inclusion are representational and institutional.
Philips (1995), for instance, has called for a ‘politics of presence’, which means
that members of disadvantaged groups are physically present in the institutions of
liberal democracy (such as parliaments). Such presence is needed because only
members of these groups have the capacity to give an authentic voice to the
exclusions and oppressions they have experienced. Besides, scholars have also
identified several institutional devices that can further the inclusion and repre-
sentation of disadvantaged groups and minorities. For instance, Proportional
Representation electoral systems or re-districting can increase the chances that
disadvantaged groups are better represented (see, e.g. Amy, 1997).
In recent years, however, models of inclusion have increasingly taken a deliberative
turn. The promise of deliberation lies in the idea of the free and fair exchange of
arguments leading to more consensual, common-good oriented, and inclusive policy
outcomes. Deliberation also takes an in-depth look at the process of policy-making, a
problem generally ignored by institutional approaches to minority inclusion. This
addresses the long-standing proble´matique that institutions do not determine beha-
vior, but only structure it. Put differently, institutional arrangements may provide
minority actors with formal means of inclusion – Young (2002) calls this ‘external’
inclusion, but this may not (always) translate into what Young calls ‘internal’
inclusion, that is, that minority demands may not be listened to and are not taken up
by majorities. A deliberative approach may help to fill this gap.
There is, however, a dearth of models specifying what deliberation among
minority and majority groups exactly means. Among the few attempts to develop
a deliberative model of inclusion is Williams’ model of legislative decision making
where ‘participants aim at mutual agreement arrived at through a process of
rational argumentation’ (Williams, 1998: 138). This model conforms to a classic,
Habermasian-inspired conception of deliberation. According to this view – which
Ba¨chtiger et al. (2010a label type I deliberation, deliberation is a systematic process of
reason-giving and reason-taking, which aims to achieve consensus via the ‘forceless
force of the better argument’. Urbinati (2000: 776), in turn, proposes a model of
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deliberative ‘advocacy’: ‘A good representative democracy needs [y] deliberators
who judge and in turn plead causes ‘passionately’ in accordance with the principles
and procedures of democratic government’. This model conforms to an expanded
program of deliberation. According to this view – which Ba¨chtiger et al. (2010a label
type II deliberation, deliberation is stripped of its rationalistic bias, and made com-
patible with passion, emotion, and the expression of self-interest.
Type II deliberative democrats have also forcefully argued that rationalist forms
of deliberation can exclude disadvantaged groups. According to Sanders (1997:
349), ‘deliberation requires not only equality in resources and the guarantee of
equal opportunity to articulate persuasive arguments but also equality in ‘‘epi-
stemological authority’’, in the capacity to evoke acknowledgement of one’s
arguments’. In this regard, Young (2001) argues that when people share convictions,
values, affective orientations, and cultural background assumptions, the persuasive-
ness and effectiveness of specific reasons is enhanced. This may disadvantage min-
ority groups, since ‘it is also the case that there are some basic factual and normative
beliefs that most members of the majority society share, and that ethnocultural
minorities may not generally hold these beliefs’ (Valadez, 2001: 87). Despite her
affinity with type I deliberation, Williams (1998: 144) refers to another limitation
when a type I model is applied to the inclusion of disadvantaged groups: ‘the status of
marginalized groups as marginalized groups reflects, by definition, the fact that some
of their fundamental interests are now systematically and unjustifiably neglected. Any
discursive process in which that neglect come to light must make space for expression
of group-specific interests’.
Indeed, a major challenge in current deliberative democracy is reconciling the
two types of deliberation (Ba¨chtiger et al., 2010a). There is agreement – even
among difference democrats and feminists – that deliberative elements such as
listening and respect are desirable features of the democratic process (see, e.g.
Bickford, 1996: Ch. 5). But many scholars would simultaneously hold that this is
desirable only in the context of ideal deliberative conditions where power rela-
tionships have been equalized. For disadvantaged groups and structural mino-
rities, a brittle type I approach to deliberation may not do. Insisting on ‘polite,
orderly, dispassionate, gentlemanly argument’ (Young, 2002: 49) in deliberation
may create the perverse effect that more deliberation will undermine inclusionary
goals. Therefore, in the context of disadvantaged groups and structural minorities,
type I models of deliberation need ‘friendly amendments’ (see Adcock and Collier,
2001, for a similar concept in measurement theory) that reduce the normative
burdens for disadvantaged discourse participants.
To be sure, attempts at reconciling the two types of deliberation must also take
into account at which locus deliberation takes place.2 While varying levels of
deliberative ability – such as the ability to present and understand rational
2 We thank Ian O’Flynn for alerting us to this proble´matique.
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arguments – is paramount for citizen deliberation, this is not necessarily true in
the context of political deliberation. Office holders are accomplished public
speakers, irrespective of background. In other words, it would be foolish to
assume that politicians from minority or disadvantaged groups would be less-
sophisticated deliberators than those from majorities and advantaged groups.
Thus, for deliberation among group representatives, the issue is not about the
ability of different sorts of actors to deliberate well or poorly, but what to do
about majorities having numbers on their side. In the following, we propose a
deliberative approach that is adapted to deliberation among representatives of
majority/advantaged groups and structural minorities/disadvantaged groups. It
focuses on one key element of deliberation, namely reciprocity (which entails
interactivity and respect).3
Reciprocity
According to Gutmann and Thompson (1996), reciprocity requires that partici-
pants offer reasons that other participants can accept. As such, reciprocity is a
‘concept of mutual exchange’ (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996: 55) entailing both
interactivity and respect. It involves an effort to listen to and engage with people
with whom we disagree and appreciate the moral force of their positions. At the
same time, a focus on reciprocity addresses inclusion and exclusion in deliberative
processes in novel ways. As Knight and Johnson (1997) have argued, the key
criterion for equality in deliberation is not equal amounts of speaking time, but
equal opportunity for political influence. By focusing on the (respectful) uptake of
each other’s arguments, reciprocity captures an important part of Knight and
Johnson’s (1997) standard.
Reciprocity has two components. First, it entails interactivity. This means that
participants engage with each other, and that they do not only give reasons but
listen and take up the reasons of other participants. As Goodin (2000: 91) notes,
‘[t]here must be uptake and engagement – other people must hear or read,
3 To be sure, there are other deliberative standards such as justification rationality, common-good
orientation, consensus orientation, and sincerity (or truthfulness). There are several reasons for dropping
these standards from our analysis. First, justification rationality may not be of particular importance for
minority–majority interaction in the political sphere. Second, common-good orientation is problematic
since we would ban the expression of interests by minorities and disadvantaged groups. Moreover,
references to the common good in politics are frequently not much more than ‘cheap talk’, being purely
rhetorical and intended to attract potential voters. Third, agreement or consensus may be too remote to
have empirical traction in real world politics. As Knight and Johnson (1997) argue, realistic conceptions
of deliberation can produce compromises that rest on greater mutual understanding and respect. Finally,
sincerity is the most problematic and disputed element of classic deliberation. On the one hand, it is
extremely difficult to capture truthfulness or sincerity empirically, since true preferences are not directly
observable. On the other hand, scholars have also questioned the importance of truthfulness for delib-
erative theory (see Markovits, 2006). Warren (2006: 177), for instance, makes a case for insincere ‘good
manners’ in the context of sensitive issues and sensitive actor relationships. Here, participants ‘self-censor
and tell little white lies for the sake of discourse-enabling recognitions’. Insincere respect might sometimes
help to advance the goals of deliberation – while sincerity might eventually stifle them.
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internalize and respond’ for a process to be judged deliberative. Despite its crucial
importance for deliberative theory, interactivity and ‘listening’ have been largely
neglected in approaches to deliberation (see Dobson, 2010: 760). We attempt to
rectify this deficiency by taking interactivity and listening seriously and developing
appropriate empirical measures for it (see below). However, our attempt to capture
‘listening’ is only an approximation of the concept, since we focus on transcripts only.
A full-blown analysis of ‘listening’ would require that we also explore whether
participants have listened to others but do not explicitly report this.4
Second, reciprocity entails respect. According to Gutmann and Thompson
(1996: 79), respect is a core principle of deliberative democracy. As Mansbridge
et al. (2012: 11) note: ‘being open to being moved by the words of another is to
respect the other as a source of reasons, claims, and perspectives’. At the same
time, mutual respect also implies non-domination ‘because relationships of
domination have already short-circuited mutual respect and, with this, deliberative
influence’ (Mansbridge et al., 2012: 11–12). Finally, respect also entails transfor-
mative power which many deliberationists view as the central goal of the process.
In an experimental study, Schneiderhan and Khan (2008) found that the more
respectful the discussion groups were, the more likely participants were to change
their position.
However, as mentioned before, in the context of the inclusion of minorities and
the disadvantaged, it would be unfair to expect that these groups must always be
responsive and respectful toward the privileged, especially if there has been
inequality in the past or if their vital interests are at stake. Thus, the ‘burden of
reciprocity’ mainly falls on majorities and privileged groups. It is mainly their
obligation to approach the claims of structural minorities and disadvantaged
groups with serious listening and respect. Conversely, minorities are not held fully
accountable to these standards. Of course, they may engage in a deliberative
process, listen to majorities, and find out whether there are convincing arguments
and solutions; however, they may also adopt a more passionate and adversarial
stance vis-a`-vis majorities and privileged groups. To illustrate what we mean by
such differential deliberative expectations, we take the example of the routine
renewal of a patent on the Confederate flag insignia in the U.S. Senate in July
1993 (see Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Williams, 2000). Carol Moseley-
Braun, the chamber’s only black member, vigorously challenged the amendment
on the basis that the Confederate flag insignia are a symbol of slavery. Moseley-
Braun’s emotional and angry speech provoked the Senate not only to take the
issue seriously, but also led a majority of senators to vote against the amendment.
Had Moseley-Braun acted in a type I deliberative way and used ‘gentlemanly
argument’ – as her opponents in the Senate asked her to do5 – her minority
4 We thank Graham Smith for highlighting this problem.
5 As Jesse Helms stated: ‘I hope the Senator from Illinois has not embarked upon an inflammatory
political gambit. We should avoid theatrics’ (Senate Debate, July 22, 1993, S9255).
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perspective may not have produced the necessary awareness among other sena-
tors. At the same time, the Confederate flag insignia example is also instructive as
to what the ‘burden of reciprocity’ of majorities and advantaged groups means in
practice. Recognizing the historical oppression of African Americans, a con-
siderable number of white as well as Southern senators not only listened carefully
to Moseley-Braun but also acknowledged that the patent renewal was an issue of
symbolism rather than routine.6
The relaxation of deliberative standards for structural minorities and dis-
advantaged groups is, however, conditional and partial. First, the less inequality
experienced in the past and the less vital interests are at stake, the more we expect
minorities to converge to the standards of majorities and privileged groups. Second,
structural minorities and disadvantaged groups are also expected to treat majorities
‘justly’. This means that minorities should not make demands that seriously com-
promize the ‘basic well-being of the majority’ (Valadez, 2001: 56) or other minorities.
Acting otherwise would only replace past injustice with new injustice.
At this point, three clarifications are in order. First, our deliberative approach to
inclusion is far from being ‘condition-free’. Williams (1998) has noted that both
the motivation for the privileged and institutional incentives may be crucial to
realizing deliberative virtues. Concerning motivation, majorities must have a
desire to be just and accommodative vis-a`-vis structural minorities and dis-
advantaged groups; or, they must have an interest in avoiding conflict (Williams,
1998: 145). With regard to institutional preconditions, empirical research shows
that the quality of deliberation is strongly tied to institutional incentives (Steiner
et al., 2004). While some institutional arrangements – competitive settings with
strong party discipline – undermine deliberative action (especially respect), others
tend to favor it – such as more consensual settings with less party discipline. Thus,
a realistic model of deliberative inclusion must take both actor motivation and
institutional incentives seriously.
Second, our deliberative approach to minority inclusion focuses on process
rather than on outcomes. While we agree that future research needs to study
inclusion from an outcome perspective as well, we do not see a fundamental
tension with a process approach to deliberation: the deliberative ‘acting’ of different
group representatives may be indicative of their willingness to find a good and
integrative solution to the problem (see Mutz, 2008). Indeed, the high quality of
deliberation in one case under study – the language article debate – was conducive to
a minority-favorable and consensual outcome.
Third, deliberationists are still defining what good deliberation means in
absolute terms. Therefore, when analyzing the deliberative behavior of majorities
and minorities, we do so only in relative terms – by comparing differences of
reciprocity levels between majorities and minorities.
6 Notice that Gutmann and Thompson (1996) use this example as an illustration for a good delib-
erative process.
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Deliberative inclusion of linguistic minorities in Switzerland: an empirical test
In the empirical part, we explore the deliberative ideal of reciprocity in the con-
text of linguistic minorities in Switzerland. Switzerland is a multicultural state
with four national languages: German, French, Italian, and Romansh. The German
speakers form a structural majority (about 72.5% of the Swiss population), while
the other linguistic groups form structural minorities. To be sure, the linguistic
groups in Switzerland do not directly qualify as ‘disadvantaged’ groups (such as
African Americans in the United States), since they have not experienced deep
inequality or even oppression in the past. Moreover, they have always been included
in the institutions of the Swiss state while enjoying a great deal of autonomy through
the institutions of federalism. Especially in parliament (the object of our study), the
criterion of ‘external’ inclusion is fulfilled. Since the linguistic groups are more or less
concentrated in different cantons and members of parliament are elected in cantonal
election districts, the linguistic groups are proportionally represented in the parlia-
ment. Nonetheless, when their vital interests are affected in national legislation,
linguistic minorities have no formal means of veto power to prevent unwanted
legislation but are generally dependent on the decisions of the German-speaking
majority to realize their interests. Moreover, linguistic minorities have also regularly
exhibited feelings of being marginalized, misunderstood, and ignored by German
speakers (see Ceschi, 1991: 57; du Bois, 1999: 35ff.). In the context of national
politics, finally, there is also an informal rule that every speaker uses his or her mother
tongue, whereby working languages in the Parliament are German and French
in committee debates and German, French, and Italian in plenary debates.7
Representatives from the French- and Italian-speaking parts may thus come up
against the problem of being ignored by German speakers simply because the
latter do not fully understand what they have said.
At the same time (and as a countervailing effect), there are also strong historical
traditions of understanding and respect among the different language groups in
Switzerland (Schmid, 1981). Political elites – and German-speaking elites in
particular – generally have identity-based preferences for the maintenance of a
multicultural Switzerland, leading them to ‘depoliticize’ linguistic conflicts and
remain open to linguistic minorities’ demands and arguments. The Swiss political
system also counts a number of features that promote the inclusion of linguistic
minorities: first, the party system is not organized along linguistic cleavages,
reducing partisan incentives to politicize linguistic conflicts. Second, it is a non-
parliamentary system, enabling individual legislators to engage in consequential
deliberation. Third, it is a consensus system favoring integrative solutions; the
consensus system is bolstered by direct democratic institutions that introduce
uncertainty into the legislative process and thus provide incentives to find common
solutions among the parties involved.
7 Only discussions in first chamber plenary debates are simultaneously translated.
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We think that the possibility of linguistic minority exclusion combined with the
identity-based preferences of the German-speaking majority for minority inclu-
sion as well as related institutional incentives make Switzerland a particularly
interesting case to study the dynamics of deliberative inclusion. In the study of
inclusion, there is an almost natural tendency to focus on those cases where
inclusion is deficient. But when it comes to the demanding presuppositions of
deliberative ideals (even in the context of a modified version as in our deliberative
approach), we need to focus on potentially positive cases as well. Such cases can
then serve, in principle, as evaluative benchmarks for cases where the histories of
interaction as well as motivational and institutional conditions for the deliberative
inclusion of structural minorities and disadvantaged groups are less favorable.
To our knowledge, this is also the first study to shed light on concrete inter-
actions among linguistic elites in Switzerland.8 To date, scholars have focused on
institutional and survey-based data in order to evaluate the degree of inclusion of
linguistic minorities (see, e.g. Ku¨bler et al., 2009 for the Swiss administration).
But neither institutions nor representational devices pre-ordain inclusive behavior
on the part of majorities. Furthermore, self-reported data as found in survey
studies can be biased by issues of social desirability. Respondents may be
unwilling to admit discriminatory attitudes when discrimination has become
politically unacceptable (such as being openly discriminatory to linguistic mino-
rities in the Swiss case). By focusing on detailed behavioral data (namely, tran-
scripts of parliamentary debates) that illuminate how the German-speaking
majority listens and talks to linguistic minorities (and vice versa) our study tries to
overcome such deficiencies. This is particularly possible behind closed doors in
committees where discussions are strictly confidential and speakers are guaranteed
anonymity. However, one limitation of our study is that actors across linguistic
groups may know each other well and may even be friends. We can partly control for
such cross-linguistic ties by taking tenure (i.e. the amount of time a legislator has
spent in parliament) and party affiliation into account. Yet a larger part of cross-
linguistic ties remains unobservable, which limits the possibility of making causal
inferences. Nonetheless, we think that our study represents a major improvement
compared with existing studies on the inclusion of linguistic groups in Switzerland.
We analyze the deliberative behavior of the different linguistic groups in Swiss
parliamentary debates in the non-public and public arenas of the first and second
chambers. We focus on parliamentary debates for two reasons. First, Thompson
(2008: 502) sees the essential aim of political deliberation as reaching binding
decisions, a criterion that parliamentary debates fulfill. Second, there is also a
practical reason for the focus on parliamentary debates: there are no other arenas
or institutions where all language groups are present and interact with each other
in the four national languages. In the civic sphere, these conditions are rarely
8 While the Steiner et al. (2004) study includes linguistic issues in Switzerland, it does not take an in-
depth look at these debates.
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(if ever) met. Thus, consequential multilingual deliberation in Switzerland on
political issues almost exclusively occurs at the elite level. Finally, some may
object that parliament is not the right locus for studying deliberative inclusion,
since parliamentary debate is conducted in a competitive, adversarial, and
rhetorical manner. Moreover, if legislators enter into policy negotiations then this
is understood as bargaining rather than deliberation. But such statements do not
consider the fact that this role depends on institutional factors, as well as on issue
characteristics. As we have argued above, the institutional architecture of the
Swiss parliament is generally favorable to a deliberative mode of interaction,
especially behind closed doors.
A central goal of our study is to determine the extent of the deliberative inclusion
(or exclusion) of linguistic minorities in parliamentary debates. We also want to shed
some light on the contexts of deliberative inclusion or exclusion. To do so, we focus,
first of all, on the distinction between non-public committee and plenary debates.
In this regard, the non-public committee stage enables us to explore deliberative
inclusion when consequential decisions are crafted. In contrast, the public plenary
stage enables us to explore deliberative inclusion when political actors justify their
decisions before the wider public and their constituencies. Drawing from empirical
approaches to deliberation (see Stasavage, 2007) as well as consociational theory
(Lijphart, 1977), we expect that political actors are less inclusive in the public sphere
than in the non-public sphere. In the public sphere, political actors need to act as
representatives of their groups and must serve constituency interests. Even though the
party system barely reflects linguistic cleavages, individual MPs might still have some
incentive to present themselves as advocates of their territorially based constituencies,
which in Switzerland are language based. By contrast, in the non-public sphere,
politicians can deliberate without external interference, making it easier for them to
show respect for the claims of others and accommodate minority interests. Con-
sociational scholars, too, have repeatedly stressed that a ‘spirit of accommodation’
among different segments of society flourishes best behind closed doors. Second, we
also consider different types of issues. If there is some motivation for majorities to
include minority demands, then we expect that reciprocity toward minorities is more
prevalent in the context of issues that touch upon the vital interests of minorities. This
expectation is in line with our modified deliberative approach: the more vital interests
of structural minorities are affected, the more majorities are expected to listen and
respond to minorities.9 There is also some empirical evidence for this claim. In a
9 In this article, we do not consider the familiar distinction between statistical and taste-based dis-
crimination. To be sure, the data would lend itself to such an analysis: we could distinguish among
minority actors speaking in French or Italian (French and Italian speakers) and minority actors speaking
in German (in the Swiss parliament, this is the case for Romansh speakers and some bi-lingual speakers)
and then evaluate whether the German-speaking majority listens mainly to those minority actors speaking
in the majority language (German); this then would classify as statistical discrimination. However, since
there are almost no discriminatory effects against minority speakers in the parliamentary debates that we
analyzed (see ‘Results’ in next section), such an analysis becomes obsolete. Conversely, the lack of
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laboratory experiment, Espinoza and Garza (1985) explored the effect of social group
salience among Hispanics and Anglo-Americans on the cooperative–competitive
behavior of subjects. They found that in a high salience condition, majority group
members (Anglo subjects) were more cooperative than minority group members
(Hispanic subjects).
Concretely, we analyze two debates on linguistic policies, which touch upon vital
interests of linguistic minorities: the language article of the 1990s (Sprachenartikel)
and the language bill of the 2000s (Sprachengesetz). In addition, we focus on a
contrasting debate, the labor law revision (Arbeitsgesetz) of the 1990s, which does
not touch upon vital interests of the linguistic minorities. Let us briefly give some
background on these debates.
Language article
The goal of the new language article was to improve the position of the Romansh
language and thus concerned with the flourishing of this tiny linguistic minority in
Switzerland. The government proposed an amendment that made explicit reference
both to the principle of the freedom of language and the territoriality principle
(stipulating that people who belong to another linguistic region must not be
instructed in their classes in any other language). ‘Weakening’ the territoriality
principle would provide Romansh speakers with more flexibility to preserve their
language. However, French- and Italian-speaking deputies argued that codifying the
territoriality principle in the Constitution would involve unforeseeable dangers for
linguistic peace since German speakers might ask for German schools in the French-
or Italian-speaking cantons. Finally, a compromize proposal found approval: none
of the principles would be mentioned in the constitution, but the central state
would help endangered linguistic minorities if cantons asked. The bill passed with
152–19 votes in the first chamber and 43–0 votes in the second chamber.
Language bill
After the rejection of a new language bill by the government in 2004, the committee
of the first chamber decided to draw up a new version of the language bill. The goal
of the bill was to secure national cohesion as well as communication between the
different linguistic groups. Article 15 of the new bill, regulating language instructions
in school, was one of the most disputed articles. The first chamber decided in favor of
prioritizing a national language, rather than English, as the first foreign language in
school. The second chamber, however, supported a proposal of the Swiss Conference
of Cantonal Ministers of Education.10 This proposal implied that of the two foreign
discrimination cannot be ascribed to German-speaking minority actors (such as Romansh or bi-lingual
speakers) either. We have performed a batch of re-analyses showing that reciprocity rates are not affected
by the language spoken (analyses available upon request).
10 Schweizerische Konferenz der kantonalen Erziehungsdirektoren (EDK).
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languages that should be learned in school, at least one should be a national lan-
guage, yet the cantons should be free to decide whether it is taught as the first
language. In order to avoid a language dispute between the linguistic communities, a
compromize solution was finally approved. The compromize solution required that
students should have competencies in the basics of two foreign languages and that at
least one of them should be a national language. The bill passed with 135–56 votes in
the first chamber and 39–0 votes in the second chamber.
Labor law revision
The labor law revision aimed at overhauling certain labor regulations and improving
the competitiveness of the Swiss economy. Two articles of the bill were seen as critical
during discussions: Article 17, dealing with night work for women, and Article 20,
dealing with work on Sundays and official holidays. The goal of the new Article 17
was to establish gender equality, especially by abolishing the ban on women working
at night. The government also proposed a 10% time bonus for regular work at night
and on Sundays. The bill was challenged by a group of right-wing deputies arguing
that the compensation measures were too far-reaching. Left-wing deputies supported
the governmental proposal. The aim of the new Article 20 was to revise trading times
with the goal of having longer opening times on Sundays and during holidays.
No compromize could be found after lengthy negotiations, and when the Swiss
Federation of Trade Unions started collecting signatures for a referendum, most right-
wing deputies gave up any search for a compromize. The bill was rejected in the final
vote by 89–80 in the first chamber and 27–6 in the second chamber.
We limit our study to three cases since an in-depth coding of reciprocity patterns is a
highly demanding and time-consuming affair. While this precludes our ability to
make sweeping generalizations, the three cases nonetheless constitute crucial cases in
Switzerland: the two linguistic debates are the only major debates on linguistic policy
that have taken place since 1938, when Romansh was recognized as the fourth
national language. The labor law, in turn, constitutes one of the key decision cases in
Switzerland in the 1990s (see Linder, 2005). Moreover, the high degree of partisan
polarization in this debate is in stark contrast with the largely non-partisan approach
in the two linguistic decision cases. Party polarization, in turn, may offset motivations
for the explicit inclusion of linguistic minorities. We think that these three crucial
cases can give important first hints regarding the extent and the contexts of the
deliberative inclusion of Swiss linguistic minorities.
Methodology
Our empirical analysis of deliberative inclusion draws on Steven Levitt’s (2004) ana-
lysis of discrimination in the United States. Levitt used the television game show
‘Weakest Link’ to test for discrimination patterns among contestants. To measure
discrimination, Levitt uses the number of votes a contestant receives as a function of
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his personal characteristics (race, gender, age), controlled for other factors (such as
performance of a contestant in the game show): if race, gender, or age yields statistically
significant effects, then Levitt speaks of discrimination. We use parliamentary com-
mittee and plenary debates to calculate frequencies of reciprocity rates as a function
of the minority or majority status of the speaker, controlling for other characteristics
of the speaker (such as gender, role, or partisan affiliation) as well as context char-
acteristics (issues, plenary sessions vs. committees, and first vs. second chamber).
Deliberative inclusion is present when there are no statistically significant differences
in reciprocity levels between structural minorities and majorities. Moreover, fol-
lowing our ‘friendly amendment’, reciprocity from majorities toward minorities
should be at least equal or even slightly biased in favor of minorities, that is, majority
actors may refer slightly more frequently and more respectfully to minority actors
than vice versa. As detailed before, we want this to be the case especially when vital
interests of structural minorities are at stake. Since linguistic minorities in Switzerland
are not severely disadvantaged groups, the ‘burden of reciprocity’ of the German-
speaking majority cannot be too high.
To measure reciprocity, we have developed an indicator measuring whether
participants respond to other participants’ demands and arguments and whether
this response is explicitly respectful, neutral, or disrespectful (for detailed coding
see Appendix 3 in the online material). Only references to MPs and Federal
Councillors are coded. Furthermore, we also coded who made references to
whom, and whether that reference was clear. If other participants were only
mentioned in connection with a proposal they submitted, they were not coded.
Simple references such as thanks, questions, and requests were not coded either.
We analyzed about 400 parliamentary speeches, with very respectable reliability
scores for our reciprocity measures: Cohen’s kappa, which controls for inter-coder
agreements by chance, is 0.82 for the response measure [i.e. whether participants
responded to each other’s arguments (or, not)] and 0.80 for the respect measures
(i.e. whether the response was explicitly respectful, neutral, or disrespectful).
Table 1 presents the matrix of incoming and outgoing references (including
respectful, neutral, and disrespectful references) of one committee session on the
language article (confidentiality requires that speaker names as well as the exact
date of the session are omitted). The shaded cells denote minority speakers
(French, Italian, or Romansh speakers).
On the basis of this matrix, we calculate different measures for incoming and out-
going references. A first measure concerns the frequency of incoming references and the
frequency of outgoing references. We calculate how often the arguments of minorities
and majorities are referred to (incoming references) and how often minorities and
majorities refer to other participants’ arguments (outgoing references). In this example,
actor B’s arguments (a minority actor) are referred to 9 times (‘in’); at the same time,
actor B does not make any reference to other participants’ arguments (‘out’) but speaks
up 3 times (‘nr_speech’). For the incoming references, we need to take into account
how often a person speaks: if a person does not make a single speech (such as actor U),
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then other persons cannot refer to his or her arguments. Thus, completely ‘silent’ actors
are excluded from the analysis. In addition, the more frequently an actor speaks, the
higher the chances that his or her arguments will be referred to. Similarly, the more an
actor speaks the higher the chances that he or she will refer to another actor. Therefore,
we need to weight the incoming and outgoing references by the number of speeches.
We do so by using the number of speeches as a predictor in the statistical analysis.11
A second batch of measures focuses on the frequency of positive and negative
incoming references and the frequency of positive and negative outgoing references.
We calculate how often the arguments of minorities and majorities are referred
to in a positive or negative way and how often minorities and majorities refer to
Table 1. Matrix of incoming and outgoing references; example from a committee
session
Notes: 05 disrespectful reference; 15 neutral reference; 25 respectful reference;
in5 number of incoming references; in15 number of respectful incoming references;
in25 number of disrespectful incoming references; out5 number of outgoing references;
out15number of respectful outgoing references; out25 number of disrespectful outgoing
references; nr_speech5 total number of speeches (including references and other speeches).
Shaded cells denote minority actors.
11 Since this produces endogeneity between the predictor and outcome variable in the statistical ana-
lysis, we have also considered another weighting procedure – dividing incoming or outgoing references by
the number of speeches. However, this makes all predictor variables dependent on the number of speeches,
producing biased results for some predictor variables. Thus, we prefer the first weighting procedure.
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other participants’ arguments in a positive or negative way. Again, we need to
take into account frequencies of incoming and outgoing references by using the
number of (positive and negative) incoming and outgoing references as predictors
in the statistical analysis.
So far, we have only considered the total number of incoming and outgoing refer-
ences, without analyzing whether these references come from linguistic minorities or
majorities. However, we may come across a situation where we find seemingly non-
discriminatory patterns of reciprocity which may, however, be produced by minorities
only referring to minorities and majorities only referring to majorities, without any
exchange between majorities and minorities. To analyze whether and how often
majorities refer to minorities’ arguments (and vice versa), we have created a third
measure of reciprocity, which we dub ‘Incoming References from Same Group’. This
measure is an index and is constructed in a straightforward and simple way. For
minorities, the number of incoming references that a minority actor gets from other
minority actors is divided by the total number of incoming references of this actor. For
majorities, the number of incoming references that a majority actor gets from other
majority actors is divided by total number of incoming references of this actor. If the
incoming references of a minority actor come only from minorities, then this actor
obtains a score of 1. Take actor C (a minority actor): his arguments are only referred to
once by actor S who is a minority actor as well; hence, actor C gets a score of 1.
Conversely, if the incoming references of a minority actor only come from majority
actors, then this person obtains a score of 0. If the incoming references come both from
majority and minority actors, we calculate a percentage rate. Take actor B, a minority
actor: he gets a total of 9 incoming references; 2 out of the 9 incoming references come
from minority actors, 7 from majority actors; hence, he gets a score of 0.22 (indicating
that there is a lot of cross-group referencing). In sum, scores closer to 1 indicate that
there is primarily same-group referencing; scores closer to 0 indicate that there is
primarily cross-group referencing. The same procedure applies to incoming positive
and negative references and outgoing positive and negative references. A final pro-
blem concerns the relationship of the index and the frequency of incoming references.
There is a possibility that the more incoming references (including positive and
negative ones) an actor gets, the more incoming references (including positive and
negative ones) will come from different groups. We control for this by using the
number of incoming references as a predictor in our statistical models.12 Descriptive
statistics for the outcome variables are reported in Appendix 1.13
12 Of course, there are other ways to explore the concept of ‘Incoming/Outgoing References from/to
Same Group’, namely by tools developed in the context of network analysis. For instance, both the
‘quadratic assignment procedure’ (QAP) and ‘exponential random graph models’ (ERGM; Lazer et al.,
2010) can be used to test for so-called ‘homophily’ effects, measuring the tendency for similar individuals
to form a tie in a network (see Gerber, 2012). Nonetheless, we think that our approach provides us with
more ‘flexibility’ in statistical analysis, especially by enabling us to run complex interactions of our
reciprocity measures with contextual variables.
13 Available on the journal website.
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Our statistical models control for a number of factors that may affect the
participation and reciprocity levels of minority and majority speakers and that
previous research has identified as important for the quality of deliberation in
parliaments (see Steiner et al., 2004; Ba¨chtiger and Hangartner, 2010): gender,
age, tenure, roles (chairperson, committee spokesperson, and Federal Councillor),
partisan affiliations, institutional contexts (public vs. non-public arenas and first
vs. second chambers), and different issues (a description of the variables is pro-
vided in Appendix 2).14 Psychologists also argue that proportion of minorities in
decision-making groups might affect the way these groups operate (Mendelberg
and Karpowitz, 2007), which in turn may affect our measures of deliberative
inclusion. Indeed, there is substantial variation in the minority/majority compo-
sition of committees and plenary sessions: in our sample of parliamentary debates,
the proportion of members from linguistic minorities ranges between 14% and
53%. However, the proportion of linguistic minorities in committees and plenary
sessions is highly collinear with issue type: in concrete, the proportion of mino-
rities is higher for linguistic issues. Therefore, we do not insert issue type and
group composition in the same statistical model.
To explore the contexts of deliberative inclusion, we include two interaction terms
in the models, namely between vital issues (language article and language law) and
linguistic minorities as well as between non-publicity and linguistic minorities. Since
the reciprocity levels are calculated on the basis of the different sessions of the
debate, we use clustered standard errors at the level of the sessions that take into
account the fact that errors may not be independent within different sessions. We
refrain from including debate sessions as fixed effects in our models, since debate
sessions are highly collinear with a number of contextual control variables. The
results are reported from negative binomial, Poisson, and Beta specifications.
The negative binomial and Poisson specifications incorporate the fact that our
reciprocity variables are count data. By using the negative binomial, we take into
account that some of the outcome variables are over-dispersed, that is, the condi-
tional variance exceeds the conditional mean (Long, 1997).15 The Beta specifica-
tions, in turn, incorporate the fact that our index of same group references is a
proportion that is bounded between 0 and 1 and follows a U-shaped distribution.
For such ratios, Beta regression is more appropriate than ordinary least square
regression. The random variable for a Beta is continuous from 0 to 1 and the Beta
distribution is bounded between 0 and 1 (but does not include 0 or 1;16 see Ferrari
and Cribari-Neto, 2004).
14 Available on the journal website.
15 We have run a number of robustness checks. First, we calculated random effects for all the models.
Results did not change. Second, we also ran zero-inflated negative poisson models for the negative
outgoing and negative incoming models in order to account for excessive zero counts. Again, the results
did not differ from the poisson models.
16 Therefore, we have rescaled 0s into 0.0000000001 and 1s into 0.9899999999.
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Results
Tables 2 and 3 present the regression results for the various indicators of reci-
procity. First, focusing on average effects of incoming and outgoing references,
there are no statistically reliable differences between minority and majority
speakers. There are, however, some statistically significant interactive effects
between minority status and issue type, both for ingoing and outgoing references.
Compared with the labor law debate, minorities receive more incoming references
in the context of the two linguistic debates, while simultaneously making slightly
more outgoing references under the latter conditions. However, the interactive
effects are substantively small and in the case of outgoing references also only
marginally significant.
Another aspect of reciprocity is whether different groups are treated with
respect. On average, the analyses for positive and negative incoming and outgoing
references display few differences between minority and majority actors. How-
ever, there is a positive and statistically significant interactive effect between
minority status and issue type for outgoing negative references. This implies that
in the two linguistic debates minority actors refer more negatively to other actors
than in the labor law debate. This result is in line with our modified deliberative
approach, explicitly allowing minorities to take a more passionate and adversarial
stance when their vital interests are concerned.
These analyses of reciprocity, however, only give information on the overall
deliberative performance of minority and majority actors. We also need to look at
reciprocity, focusing on how often linguistic minorities are referred to by the
German-speaking majority (and vice versa). To do so, we have created an index
capturing whether there is primarily same-group interaction (with scores going to
1) or cross-group interaction (with scores going to 0). Looking at the raw figures
of the index (see Appendix 1),17 the picture looks quite bright: for incoming
references, minorities reach an average score of 0.58, whereas the German-
speaking majority reaches an average score of 0.65. For outgoing references, the
respective scores are 0.56 and 0.59. These figures show that there is substantial
degree of cross-referencing between the German-speaking majority and linguistic
minorities. This is also corroborated by the statistical models in Tables 4 and 5.
First, with regard to incoming references from same group (model 7a) there are no
statistically significant differences between linguistic minorities and the German-
speaking majority. Second, for positive incoming reciprocity (model 8a), we even
find a statistically negative effect of minority speakers, indicating that linguistic
minorities receive more respectful references from the German-speaking majority
than vice versa.
In addition, there are a number of interactive effects. For the index of ‘incoming
references of same group’ (model 7b), the interaction terms between minority
17 Available on the journal website.
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Table 2. Measures of reciprocity
Model 1a
Incoming
references
Model 1b
Incoming
references
Model 2a
Outgoing
references
Model 2b
Outgoing
references
Model 3a
Positive
incoming
references
Model 3b
Positive
incoming
references
Minority Speakers 0.12 20.30 20.10 20.511 0.21 0.39
(0.09) (0.19) (0.12) (0.27) (0.23) (0.45)
Language Article 0.03 20.09 0.05 20.15 0.16 0.13
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.25) (0.42)
Language Law 0.20 0.03 0.34* 0.14 0.541 0.76*
(0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.19) (0.30) (0.36)
Minority3Language 0.351 0.561 20.04
Article (0.21) (0.30) (0.67)
Minority3Language 0.43* 0.531 20.52
Bill (0.21) (0.30) (0.51)
Non-Public Arena 0.03 20.05 20.05 20.04 20.23 20.27
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.17) (0.28) (0.41)
Minority3Non- 0.15 20.04 0.12
Public Arena (0.13) (0.20) (0.43)
Second Chamber 0.23* 0.25* 0.211 0.211 0.28 0.25
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.23) (0.23)
CVP 20.211 20.25* 20.201 20.25* 0.32 0.37
(0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.25) (0.29)
SP 20.04 20.05 20.16 20.17 0.02 0.02
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.26) (0.27)
SVP 20.03 20.03 20.08 20.08 0.04 0.04
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.25) (0.25)
Greens 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06 20.76 20.67
(0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.23) (0.78) (0.78)
EDU/EVP/LIB/LDU 20.15 20.17 0.02 0.01 0.27 0.34
(0.16) (0.16) (0.22) (0.21) (0.36) (0.40)
AP/LEGA 20.15 20.24 20.33 20.40 0.09 0.19
(0.22) (0.21) (0.44) (0.44) (0.67) (0.66)
Committee 0.17 0.17 0.361 0.36* 20.09 20.11
Spokesperson (0.23) (0.23) (0.19) (0.18) (0.31) (0.29)
Chairperson 21.00** 20.97** 20.53** 20.52** 20.53 20.52
(0.29) (0.28) (0.20) (0.20) (0.44) (0.45)
Federal Councillor 20.07 20.05 0.96** 1.01** 0.21 0.35
(0.24) (0.24) (0.15) (0.16) (0.43) (0.37)
Age 20.00 20.00 20.02* 20.02** 20.02 20.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Tenure 20.00 20.00 0.02** 0.02** 20.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Gender 20.42** 20.41** 20.09 20.09 20.07 20.14
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.22) (0.23)
Number of speeches 0.19** 0.19** 0.18** 0.18**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of incoming 0.31** 0.31**
references (0.02) (0.03)
Constant 20.17 0.11 0.36 0.63 21.67* 21.82*
(0.34) (0.33) (0.36) (0.39) (0.81) (0.87)
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Table 2. (Continued)
Model 1a
Incoming
references
Model 1b
Incoming
references
Model 2a
Outgoing
references
Model 2b
Outgoing
references
Model 3a
Positive
incoming
references
Model 3b
Positive
incoming
references
a 0.32** 0.31** 0.22** 0.22**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Log-likelihood 2975.42 2972.92 2933.57 2930.14 2300.86 2300.06
BIC 2079.44 2093.73 1995.73 2008.16 723.89 741.05
N 620 620 620 620 620 620
Method Negative
Binomial
Negative
Binomial
Negative
Binomial
Negative
Binomial
Poisson Poisson
Notes: Estimated standard errors (clustered at the level of debate sequences) are shown in
parentheses.
**P, 0.01, *P, 0.05, 1P, 0.10.
Table 3. Measures of reciprocity cont.
Model 4a Model 4b Model 5a Model 5b Model 6a Model 6b
Negative
incoming
references
Negative
incoming
references
Positive
outgoing
references
Positive
outgoing
references
Negative
outgoing
references
Negative
outgoing
references
Minority Speakers 0.25 0.16 20.33 20.81** 20.31 21.95**
(0.19) (0.28) (0.21) (0.29) (0.28) (0.56)
Language Article 20.85* 21.171 20.05 20.33 20.51 20.92**
(0.43) (0.60) (0.24) (0.27) (0.33) (0.32)
Language Law 20.78* 20.47 0.441 0.39 20.88** 21.72**
(0.31) (0.40) (0.22) (0.25) (0.31) (0.51)
Minority3Language 0.66 1.00* 1.51**
Article (0.51) (0.46) (0.48)
Minority3Language 20.61 0.27 2.13**
Bill (0.41) (0.35) (0.65)
Non-Public Arena 20.43 20.51 20.09 20.14 20.08 20.32
(0.31) (0.39) (0.24) (0.21) (0.29) (0.37)
Minority3Non- 0.25 0.14 0.79
Public Arena (0.41) (0.35) (0.49)
Second Chamber 21.07* 21.12* 0.18 0.16 20.75* 20.60*
(0.46) (0.46) (0.24) (0.23) (0.30) (0.30)
CVP 0.30 0.36 20.26 20.28 0.57 0.32
(0.41) (0.44) (0.19) (0.21) (0.36) (0.35)
SP 0.28 0.30 20.15 20.17 0.611 0.591
(0.46) (0.47) (0.23) (0.24) (0.33) (0.32)
SVP 0.61 0.61 20.51* 20.54* 0.55 0.54
(0.40) (0.41) (0.23) (0.23) (0.36) (0.33)
Greens 0.71 0.79 20.48 20.43 20.68 20.63
(0.56) (0.58) (0.59) (0.59) (0.76) (0.78)
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status and issue type are positive and significant, implying that minority actors do
more same-group referencing in the two linguistic issues than in the labor law
debate. One possible reason for this is that in both linguistic debates there was
also serious disagreement within the minority groups, which may have been
conducive to more same-group referencing. With regard to the index of ‘outgoing
references from same group’, our deliberative approach has a special focus on the
behavior of the German-speaking majority. Therefore, we consider the interaction
terms between majority status and issue types (rather than minority status and
issue type). Model 9b shows that the interaction terms between majority and issue
types are negative and significant for outgoing references. This means that in the
linguistic debates, the German-speaking majority made more references to
minorities than in the labor law debate. This result is in line with our conception
of the burden of reciprocity: majorities are expected to make special efforts to
reach out to structural minorities when the latter’s vital interests are concerned.
A similar pattern can be observed for positive outgoing references of same group
Table 3. (Continued)
EDU/EVP/LIB/LDU 20.61 20.50 20.09 20.04 0.61 0.38
(0.61) (0.64) (0.39) (0.39) (0.45) (0.46)
AP/LEGA 20.21 20.15 21.64 21.61 0.78 0.54
(0.68) (0.67) (1.24) (1.25) (0.48) (0.51)
Committee 20.70 20.65 20.791 20.77 0.47 0.50
Spokesperson (0.83) (0.83) (0.45) (0.50) (0.34) (0.38)
Chairperson 0.16 0.22 21.40** 21.36** 22.54** 22.36**
(0.52) (0.53) (0.44) (0.42) (0.51) (0.52)
Federal Councillor 20.07 20.01 20.32 20.21 21.11 21.11
(0.55) (0.54) (0.28) (0.30) (0.86) (0.88)
Age 0.00 0.01 20.02 20.031 20.01 20.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Tenure 20.01 20.01 0.04* 0.04** 20.01 20.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Gender 20.93* 21.02* 20.41 20.421 21.00** 20.85**
(0.42) (0.42) (0.25) (0.24) (0.34) (0.32)
Number of incoming 0.26** 0.27**
references (0.03) (0.03)
Number of outgoing 0.35** 0.36** 0.37** 0.37**
references (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Constant 21.86* 22.001 21.22 20.93 22.45* 21.66
(1.00) (1.04) (0.88) (0.85) (1.15) (1.18)
Log-likelihood 2211.24 2209.04 2303.27 2301.52 2203.85 2196.96
BIC 544.65 559.54 728.70 744.49 529.87 535.37
N 620 620 620 620 620 620
Method Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Notes: Estimated standard errors (clustered at the level of debate sequences) are shown in
parentheses.
**P, 0.01, *P, 0.05, 1P, 0.10.
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Table 4. Measures of reciprocity cont.
Model 7a Model 7b Model 8a Model 8b
Incoming
references
from same
group (index)
Incoming
references
from same
group (index)
Positive
incoming
references from
same group (index)
Positive
incoming
references from
same group (index)
Minority Speakers 20.09 20.63 20.81* 21.75**
(0.22) (0.40) (0.41) (0.43)
Language Article 0.30 20.36 0.01 20.34
(0.22) (0.37) (0.38) (0.47)
Language Law 0.07 20.541 0.22 20.87*
(0.18) (0.32) (0.38) (0.39)
Minority3Language 1.55** 0.66
Article (0.53) (0.64)
Minority3Language 1.50** 2.18**
Bill (0.46) (0.51)
Non-Public Arena 20.09 0.38 0.12 0.34
(0.15) (0.27) (0.26) (0.43)
Minority3Non-Public 21.06* 20.44
Arena (0.42) (0.52)
Second Chamber 20.13 20.12 20.38 20.38
(0.15) (0.15) (0.33) (0.24)
CVP 0.15 0.07 20.15 20.29
(0.19) (0.20) (0.29) (0.32)
SP 0.17 0.18 0.01 0.16
(0.22) (0.21) (0.41) (0.32)
SVP 0.28 0.31 20.63 20.48
(0.26) (0.24) (0.60) (0.61)
Greens 0.25 0.26 20.81 21.29
(0.45) (0.50) (1.22) (1.08)
EDU/EVP/LIB/LDU 0.11 0.19 0.39 0.19
(0.32) (0.33) (0.35) (0.31)
AP/LEGA 20.08 20.29 21.05 21.771
(0.53) (0.43) (1.05) (1.08)
Committee 20.07 20.03 20.43 0.00
Spokesperson (0.42) (0.39) (0.84) (0.77)
Chairperson 20.22 20.26 0.40 0.25
(0.28) (0.28) (0.74) (0.49)
Federal Councillor 0.05 0.10 20.17 20.10
(0.35) (0.32) (0.32) (0.38)
Age 0.00 20.01 20.01 20.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Tenure 0.00 20.00 20.01 20.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Gender 20.351 20.34* 0.00 0.08
(0.18) (0.17) (0.40) (0.38)
Number of Incoming 0.11** 0.10**
References (0.02) (0.02)
Number of Positive 0.181 0.15
Incoming References (0.11) (0.09)
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Table 4. (Continued)
Constant 20.45 20.03 20.04 0.66
(0.71) (0.70) (1.03) (1.08)
Phi 0.35** 0.37** 0.26** 0.29**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Log-likelihood 1356.05 1369.98 760.56 765.83
BIC 22592.02 22601.87 21427.29 21423.77
N 405 405 109 109
Method Beta Beta Beta Beta
Notes: Estimated standard errors (clustered at the level of debate sequences) are shown in
parentheses.
**P, 0.01, *P, 0.05, 1P, 0.10.
Table 5. Measures of Reciprocity cont.
Model 9a Model 9b Model 10a Model 10b
Outgoing
references to
same group
(index)
Outgoing
references to
same group
(index)
Positive
outgoing
references to same
group (index)1
Positive
outgoing
references to same
group (index)1
Majority Speakers 20.01 0.93* 20.04 1.10
(0.22) (0.39) (0.33) (0.85)
Language Article 20.15 0.561 0.11 0.87
(0.20) (0.32) (0.43) (0.69)
Language Law 20.31* 0.64* 0.08 1.031
(0.14) (0.26) (0.40) (0.57)
Majority3Language 21.10* 21.17
Article (0.45) (0.93)
Majority3Language 21.52** 21.721
Bill (0.44) (0.89)
Non-Public Arena 20.20* 20.341 0.08 0.30
(0.10) (0.21) (0.24) (0.54)
Majority3Non-Public 0.30 0.04
Arena (0.36) (0.71)
Second Chamber 20.42** 20.40** 20.49 20.35
(0.15) (0.15) (0.33) (0.34)
CVP 20.05 20.18 0.06 20.13
(0.23) (0.24) (0.32) (0.37)
SP 20.16 20.25 0.18 0.18
(0.21) (0.20) (0.33) (0.33)
SVP 20.12 20.17 0.49 0.541
(0.29) (0.28) (0.39) (0.30)
Greens 0.01 20.05
(0.33) (0.33)
EDU/EVP/LIB/LDU 20.03 20.03 20.27 20.50
(0.28) (0.29) (0.30) (0.32)
AP/LEGA 0.57 0.39
(0.37) (0.39)
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(model 10b, although the effect is only marginally significant). Notice, however,
that linguistic minorities are far from being disrespectful toward majority
speakers: in absolute terms, linguistic minorities made 28 positive references
toward the German-speaking majority (whereas majority speakers made 47 positive
references toward minority speakers). This indicates the willingness of linguistic
minorities to include majority demands and arguments as well. With regard to
negative incoming and outgoing references, the small number of observations
(especially in the range between 0 and 1) makes it difficult to estimate robust
models. Therefore, we do not report any findings.
Finally, for our index of ‘incoming references from same group’ (model 7b),
there is also a negative and significant interaction effect between non-public arena
Table 5. (Continued)
Model 9a Model 9b Model 10a Model 10b
Outgoing
references to
same group
(index)
Outgoing
references to
same group
(index)
Positive
outgoing
references to same
group (index)1
Positive
outgoing
references to same
group (index)1
Committee 0.05 0.10 0.64 0.86
Spokesperson (0.34) (0.31) (0.61) (0.54)
Chairperson 20.431 20.47* 0.31 0.24
(0.23) (0.24) (0.41) (0.50)
Federal Councillor 20.15 20.05 20.55 20.55
(0.29) (0.28) (0.36) (0.42)
Age 0.01 0.00 20.01 20.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Tenure 20.03* 20.03* 0.02 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Gender 20.03 0.03 0.11 0.10
(0.22) (0.22) (0.45) (0.44)
Number of Outgoing 0.16** 0.16**
References (0.03) (0.03)
Number of positive 0.57** 0.59**
Outgoing References (0.11) (0.11)
Constant 20.52 20.91 21.24 22.391
(0.72) (0.61) (0.99) (1.36)
Phi 0.34** 0.36** 0.27** 0.28**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Log-likelihood 1580.08 1587.80 881.66 884.27
BIC 23040.94 23038.49 21679.22 21670.40
N 388 388 107 107
Method Beta Beta Beta Beta
Notes: Estimated standard errors (clustered at the level of debate sequences) are shown in
parentheses.
**P, 0.01, *P, 0.05, 1P, 0.10.
1Greens as well as AP/LEGA are perfectly predicted.
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and linguistic minorities. This implies that there is more cross-group referencing
in the committee debates than in the plenary sessions. Given the fact that con-
sequential decisions are generally crafted in the non-public committees, this is
good news for the deliberative inclusion of linguistic minorities.
In sum, we think that these results for reciprocity are remarkable. Focusing on
the extent of deliberative inclusion, the reciprocity levels between minority and
majority actors differ little, and levels of respect are also similar; if they differ,
then this is always tilted in favor of linguistic minorities. What stands out,
however, are the interactive effects between minority/majority status and different
types of issues. While there is a tendency of minorities to refer more to their own
groups in the context of linguistic policies, the German-speaking majority
simultaneously makes an explicit effort to refer more frequently to linguistic
minorities under such conditions. Of course, our findings are based on a limited
number of cases. To what extent we can generalize from our analysis remains
open. However, we would still argue that our findings provide important first
hints of how the deliberative inclusion of linguistic minorities works in the Swiss
parliament (e.g. Ba¨chtiger and Hangartner, 2010).
As for control variables, most control variables play no major role in shaping
reciprocity levels. However, we detect an interesting discriminatory effect for
women: when it comes to the frequency of incoming references, women get less
incoming references than men (see Table 2). Moreover, there are some statistically
significant effects for second chamber, chairpersons, Federal Councillors, and
experience whereas partisan affiliation barely affects participation and reciprocity
levels. These results are in line with previous findings on parliamentary deliberation,
thus providing a validity check for the results obtained for the deliberative inclusion
of linguistic minorities.
Conclusion
The study of minority inclusion is taking a deliberative turn. Even though most
scholars still cling to institutional devices (such as formal representation or veto
institutions) to include minorities and the disadvantaged in policy-making pro-
cesses, it is unclear whether such ‘external’ inclusion also leads to ‘internal’
inclusion, that is, that minority demands are considered and are taken up by
majorities (see Young, 2002). Deliberative approaches centering on reciprocity
may fill this gap. Yet, deliberative approaches to minority inclusion have their
own pitfalls. They may not adequately take into account the fact that majorities have
the force of numbers on their side, potentially undermining the deliberative ideal of
symmetric dialogue. Moreover, requiring the selflessness and self-transformation of
the disadvantaged is not fair. In this paper, we have presented a deliberative model of
‘internal’ inclusion, focusing on reciprocity and respect in interactions between
minorities and majorities. Reciprocity and respect are key components of the delib-
erative model (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996). Extending the work of Gutmann
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and Thompson, however, our focus on reciprocity and respect comes with a ‘friendly
amendment’: we have put the ‘burden of reciprocity’ mainly on majorities and
privileged groups. It is mainly their obligation to listen seriously and respond to the
demands and arguments of minorities and the disadvantaged and show a willingness
to respect and accommodate these interests. At the same time, this relaxation is
conditional and partial. The less inequality minorities have experienced and the less
their vital interests are at stake, the more we expect them to converge to the standards
of majorities and privileged groups. Moreover, structural minorities and dis-
advantaged groups are also expected to make ‘just’ demands that do not compromize
the basic well-being of majorities. Empirically, we applied our model to the inter-
action of linguistic groups in the Swiss parliament. We took a detailed look at
reciprocity (interactivity and respect) in three decision cases, where two concerned
the vital interests of linguistic minorities (linguistic article and linguistic bill) while
one did not (labor law revision).
From the perspective of our deliberative approach, our findings are indicative of
a highly egalitarian, sometimes even minority-favoring mode of interaction
between the German-speaking majority and linguistic minorities. For reciprocity,
our analysis generally documents a non-discriminatory pattern of referencing.
Our in-depth analysis reveals that the German-speaking majority makes an effort
to reach out more frequently to minorities under such conditions. In other words,
the German-speaking majority is willing to shoulder the ‘burden of reciprocity’
when linguistic minorities’ vital interests are concerned. The results also show that
the majority listened carefully to arguments from linguistic minorities and refer-
red to them in a highly respectful fashion. At the same time, linguistic minorities
are slightly more self-referential and adversarial under such conditions. But from
the perspective of our modified deliberative approach, it is legitimate for mino-
rities to be less responsive to majorities and do politics in a slightly more adver-
sarial and passionate way when their vital interests are affected. Yet we should not
overlook the fact that linguistic minorities also made numerous of respectful
utterances toward majorities. As such, linguistic minorities also fulfilled the
obligation of being ‘just’ toward majorities, that is, retaining a modicum of
respect toward majorities’ demands and arguments.
Of course, the substantial degree of deliberative inclusion we found for lin-
guistic minorities in Switzerland mirrors the country’s fairly ideal setting for
deliberative action. On the one hand, the Swiss political system involves a non-
parliamentary consensus system and a party system, which is not organized along
linguistic cleavages. This creates a flexible system of policy-making in which both
the linguistic majority and the linguistic minorities are not (fully) bound by either
partisan or group interests and can thus enter into relatively unconstrained
deliberative interaction. On the other hand, this favorable institutional archi-
tecture is supported by appropriate motivations: many elite actors – and in
particular German speakers – have identity-based preferences for the preservation
of a multicultural Switzerland (Ba¨chtiger and Steiner, 2004). This latter aspect
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may indeed be a crucial factor for minority inclusion (or, exclusion). As Vatter and
Danaci (2010) find in an empirical analysis of direct-democratic votes that concerned
minority rights in Switzerland, minorities have no difficulty realizing their interests as
soon as they are viewed as a legitimate minority. Conversely, if minority groups are
not viewed as legitimate minorities, majorities are far less willing to take minority
interests into account. As such, our deliberative approach to inclusion may be highly
dependent on appropriate actor motivations and appropriate perceptions of mino-
rities and disadvantaged groups. While the Swiss consensus system creates incentives
to be inclusive, the respectful ‘acting’ of the German-speaking majority toward lin-
guistic minorities cannot be fully attributed to institutional incentives and necessities.
Respect toward minority demands, for instance, is surely favored by specific insti-
tutional settings, but can hardly be prescribed by them. In the ongoing debate on
the deliberative contours and related conflict-solving capacities of consociational
institutions (Steiner et al., 2004; O’Flynn, 2007; O’Flynn, 2010), both our model and
the results from the Swiss case indicate that classic consociationalism with its stress
on actor willingness for successful cleavage management may not be as outdated as
some have speculated (see, e.g. Horowitz, 2002).
Our study only delineates a starting point for exploring the deliberative
inclusion of minorities and disadvantaged groups. Future research not only needs
to engage in systematic comparative analysis of deliberative inclusion, it must also
systematically explore the connection between process and outcomes. To date, we
have only scattered evidence on whether a desirable decision-making process also
translates into more deliberatively desirable outcomes. So far, most of the existing
evidence is positive (see, e.g. Spo¨rndli, 2004), but we must be open to the pos-
sibility that pathways other than deliberation lead to democratically desirable
outcomes. Finally, our analysis of deliberative inclusion should contain dynamic
aspects as well. In particular, we need to develop a more dynamic conception
of the burden of reciprocity. In this regard, one could formulate an additional
proviso, namely that the more inclusive majorities and advantaged groups are
toward minorities and disadvantaged groups in the discussion process, the more
we expect the latter to act likewise over time. These limitations notwithstanding,
our study carves out both normative standards and empirical strategies to capture
the deliberative aspects of one of the central challenges in democratic theory,
namely the inclusion of structural minorities and disadvantaged groups.
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